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Research

I am currently pursuing the research project Knowledge and Reasoning. The goal is to produce new insights into the role of knowledge in theoretical reasoning. The project is ambitious and it involves traditional and formal epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and social psychology. Some of my recent and forthcoming work disseminates key epistemological results of this research. This work is featured in volumes of collected papers with Oxford University Press and Springer, as well as in articles in collections and journals such as Synthese, American Philosophical Quarterly, and Erkenntnis. A network of philosophers in four different continents and at the top of the profession also contributes to these and other aspects of the project.

 


Volumes


Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein. Co-edited with Branden Fitelson and Cherrie Braden. Synthese Library (in production).

Knowledge and Justification: New Perspectives (Special Issue of Synthese; contract signed, expected Spring 2019).

Special Epistemology Issue of Manuscrito (v:40;n:4, 2017). Guest Editor.

Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem (2017). Co-edited with Peter Klein and Claudio de Almeida. Oxford University Press. (order it here.)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Papers


Knowledge from Knowledge (forthcoming). American Philosophical Quarterly.

Gettier and Externalism (forthcoming). The Gettier Problem (S. Hetherington, ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary (forthcoming). Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat. (expected Spring 2019).

On Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst (2017). Manuscrito v.41:1. (part of a book symposium; Pritchard replies.)

Inferential Knowledge and The Gettier Conjecture (2017). Explaining Knowledge. OUP.

Introduction (2017). Explaining Knowledge. (with Klein, and De Almeida). OUP.

E=K and the Gettier Problem: A Reply to Comesaña and Kantin (2017). Erkenntnis 85(2), 1031-1041.

Unreasonable Selflessness (2016) (with Felipe Medeiros). Veritas 61 (3), 492-502.

Bad Luck for the Anti-Luck Epistemologist (2016). The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4), 463-479. doi: 10.1111/sjp.12200.

A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams  (2016). Logos and Episteme VII, 1. (volume contains a rejoinder from Williams).

On Synchronic Dogmatism (2015). Synthese 192 (11), 3677-3693.

How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge (2014). Logos and Episteme, V 4, I 2, 2014, p.133-140.